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This article examines the way in which the Australian legal system protects
human rights. It discusses the paucity of constitutionally protected rights and
the failure of various attempts made to amend the Constitution in this respect.
The paper looks at the inadequacy of the Australian common law and
legislation in the protection of rights. It argues that the politics of both
federalism and legalism have produced a culture wary of rights discourse. The
paper concludes by considering how the Australian protection of rights can be
improved and suggests that one way ahead would be to introduce an
Australian charter of rights.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Australians are complacent about the protection of human rights
in our country. In national and international fora we proclaim the
satisfactory nature of our legal system in securing the rights of
individuals. Occasionally we acknowledge that some groups, particularly
the Australian Aborigines, may have legitimate complaints that the legal
system does not go far enough in defending their rights.1 But we believe
that problems can be resolved by tinkering at the edges of an otherwise
admirable human rights legal regime 2
This paper will argue that such confidence is misplaced. It first
describes the haphazard and incomplete structure of human rights law in
Australia, where no catalogue of constitutionally entrenched rights exists
and common law protection of rights is minimal. Further, the
Commonwealth government's legislative power to implement
international obligations with respect to human rights has been only
partially and inadequately exploited, and the states generally have given
the protection of human rights a low legislative priority. Also,
Australian participation in international human rights instruments has
often been diffident. The structure of Australian human rights law has
been shaped by both the politics of federalism and a dedication to
legalism as the appropriate mode of legal reasoning. These two forces
have operated in the same direction to create a culture wary of the
discourse of rights. Recently, however, signs of change have emerged.
The Australian High Court has indicated a new interest in the protection
of rights, the rather moribund debate about an Australian bill of rights
has been revived, and Australia has accepted a number of international
human rights complaint mechanismsg
This paper considers how the protection of human rights in
Australia can be improved for the twenty-first century. What lessons can
Australians draw from Canada? Although many Canadian scholars are
ambivalent about the constitutional entrenchment of protection of
rights, I argue here that one way to develop human rights protection in
Australia would be to introduce an Australian bill or charter of rights.
1 Australian Prime Minister, Paul Keating, gave a particularly frank statement of this problem
at the Australian launch of the International Year of the World's Indigenous People. Reprinted in
TheAge (11 December 1992).
2 See B. Hayden, "Human Rights: The Practical and Moral Imperative" (1987) 58 Austl.
Foreign Aff. Rec. 240 at 243.
3 All these developments are discussed below.
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II. THE STRUCTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN
AUSTRALIA
A. Constitutional Rights in Australia
Although the United States Constitution greatly influenced the
drafting of the Australian Constitution, the latter includes only partial
and shadowy versions of the former's rights guarantees. 4 One reason for
this was the founding fathers' determination to preserve maximum
autonomy for the states. A particular objection with respect to a
proposed equal protection clause was that it would preclude existing
state legislation that discriminated against non-Europeans 5 Another
was the drafters' confidence in a philosophy of utilitarianism, securing
the greatest happiness of the greatest number, and the sense that "the
protections to individual rights provided by the traditions of acting as
honourable men were quite sufficient for a civilized society. ''6
The absence of a catalogue of guarantees of rights in the
Australian Constitution has since been explained as a consequence of
the institution of responsible government. Thus, Sir Owen Dixon, an
admired and influential member of the High Court, explained to an
American audience in 1942 that a study of the American Constitution
"fired no [Australian constitutional drafter] with enthusiasm for the
principle [of guarantees of rights]." He continued: "Why, asked the
Australian democrats, should doubt be thrown on the wisdom and safety
4 Except for a reference to freedom of conscience and practice of religion "subject to public
order and morality" in the Tasmanian Constitution [Constitution Act 1934 (Tas.), s. 34], the
constitutions of the Australian states do not contain any explicit protection of human rights. The
Legal and Constitutional Committee of the Victorian Parliament recommended in 1987 that
responsibility for human rights should be vested in Parliament through the creation of a
parliamentary committee to scrutinize all bills for their human rights implications. It also
recommended the insertion of a non-enforceable "Victorian Declaration of Rights and Freedoms"
in the Victorian Constitution. See Parliament of Victoria, Legal and Constitutional Committee,
Report on lhe Desirability or Othervise of Legislation Defining and Protecting Human Rights (April
1987). The recommendation was rejected by the Labor government, but may be revived by the
Liberal government elected in October 1992. In 1988, the Labor government introduced a bill for a
declaratory statement of rights, which was never enacted. The Queensland government's Electoral
and Administrative Reform Commission is currently conducting an inquiry into whether
Queensland should have a bill of rights.
5 H. Charlesworth, "Individual Rights and the Australian High Court" (1986) 4 Law in
Context 52 at 53.
6 R.C.L; Moffatt, "Philosophical Foundations of the Australian Constitutional Tradition"
(1965) 5 Syd. L. Rev. 85 at 86. See also J. La Nauze, The Making of the Australian Constitution
(Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1972) at 231-32.
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of entrusting to the chosen representatives of the people, sitting either in
the federal Parliament or in the State Parliaments, all legislative power,
substantially without fetter or restriction?"7 Prime Minister Menzies
later offered a more detailed account of the protection of individual
rights in the Australian political process:
Should a Minister do something which is thought to violate fundamental human freedom
he can be promptly brought to account in Parliament. If his Government supports him,
the Government may be attacked, and, if necessary defeated. And if that ... leads to a
new General Election, the people will express their judgment at the polling booths. In
short, responsible government in a democracy is regarded by us as the ultimate guarantee
of justice and individual rights.8
This rationale for the absence of guarantees of rights in the
Australian Constitution has been inaccurate. Reliance on the system of
responsible government assumes that the legislature, of which, by
definition, a majority will belong to the same political party as the
relevant Minister, will have an interest in calling the Minister to answer
for a particular executive action. The tenacity of the system of party
loyalty in Australia means that this is unlikely to occur. For the same
reason it offers no safeguard against arbitrary legislative action.
Responsible government relies ultimately for its effectiveness upon the
electorate's disapproval of the action, and that disapproval is unlikely if
the action affects a minority.
Three provisions in the Australian Constitution9 deal directly with
matters that can be categorized as human rights. These are: section 80,
which provides a citizen, when charged on indictment for a federal
offence, the right to a jury trial within the state where the alleged
offence took place; section 116, which denies federal legislative power
with respect to religion; and section 117, which protects residents of one
state from special disability or discrimination, based upon residence, in
other states. The traditionally narrow interpretation of these provisions
by the Australian High Court has long prevented them from offering any
real protection to human rights.1° The "original intent" of the drafters
70. Dixon, "Two Constitutions Compared" in Hon. J. Woinarski, ed., Jesting Pilate and Other
Papers andAddresses (Sydney: Law Book Co., 1965) 100 at 102.
8 R. Menzies, Central Power in theAustralian Commonwealth (London: Cassell, 1967) at 54.
9 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900, 63 & 64 Victoria, c. 12 (U.K.)-the
covering act-was the Act of Parliament at Westminster, which took effect from 1901 and
established Australia as a federal nation-state. The Australian Constitution, all 128 sections of it,
comprises section 9 of the covering act just referred to. All future references to the Australian
Constitution refer to the document that forms section 9 of the covering Act.
10 Charlesworth, supra note 5 at 54-62.
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has been invoked to support limited readings of constitutional rights
according to a purported literal analysis of the language. Thus, Chief
Justice Barwick could say rather ingenuously of the jury trial guarantee
of section 80, "[w]hat might have been thought to be a great
constitutional provision has been discovered to be a mere procedural
provision."11 Two economic rights, those relating to freedom in
interstate trade' 2 and to payment of just terms for Commonwealth
acquisitions of property13 have been more expansively interpreted.
Peter Bailey has recently argued that the Constitution should be
recognized as containing a much larger catalogue of rights! 4 The
jurisprudence generated by these provisions thus far, however, does not
exploit their potential to protect human rights.
Since the late 1980s, the High Court has taken a keener interest
in developing the constitutional guarantees of rights. For example, in
Street v. Queensland Bar Association,15 the High Court used section 117
of the Constitution for the first time, to strike down Queensland
legislation, which protected that state's lawyers from interstate
competition.
Three major reviews of the Constitution have taken place since
federation. First, the Royal Commission on the Constitution in 1929
simply noted that the Constitution did little to regulate the relations
between government and individuals. 6 Second, the Joint Parliamentary
Committee's report on Constitutional Review in 1959 responded to
submissions that endorsed the adoption of a charter of individual
liberties by stating that "as long as governments are democratically
elected and there is full parliamentary responsibility to the electors, the
protection of individual liberties will, in practice, be secure in
Australia."17
Third, the Constitutional Commission, which reported in 1988,
11 Spratt v. Hermes (1965), 114 C.L.R. 226 at 244.
1 2 Australian Constitution, supra note 9 at s. 92.
1 3 ibid. at s. 51(31).
14 p. Bailey, Human Rights: Australia in an International Context (Sydney: Butterworths, 1990)
at 84-86.
15 (1989), 168 C.LR. 461.
16 Australia, Report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution (Canberra: Australian
Government Printer, 1929) at 18.
1 7 Australia, Report fronm the Joint Committee on Constitutional Review (Canberra: Australian
Government Printer, 1959) at para. 328. On the background to this review, see B. Galligan,
"Australia's Rejection of a Bill of Rights" (1990) 28 J. Commonw. & Comp. Pol. 344 at 350-52.
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was asked to consider including a bill of rights in the Constitution after
the Commonwealth government abandoned an attempt to obtain a
legislative bill of rights in 1986. The Commission's Advisory Committee
on Individual and Democratic Rights proposed various constitutional
restraints on governments' power to interfere with individuals and on
guarantees of political rights, rather than a full bill of rights. It also
recommended including an "opting out" procedure for governments in
order to preserve the democratic nature of government.18 The Final
Report of the Constitutional Commission went further than its Advisory
Committee. It recommended the inclusion of a catalogue of rights and
freedoms in the Constitution, modelled after the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms.19 By a majority, the Commission recommended
against an opt-out clause.20 The Commission also recommended
extending existing rights provisions in the Constitution.2 1 Although the
Commission's detailed report appears thus far to have had very little
political impact, more recent proposals for constitutional change have
included guarantees of rights. The Constitutional Centenary
Conference held in Sydney in April 1991 identified guarantees of rights
generally as a key issue for the decade leading up to the centenary of the
Constitution.
Two formal attempts were made to amend the Constitution to
include greater guarantees of rights. The first attempt occurred in 1944.
At the instigation of a Labor government, a referendum was held to
obtain approval of constitutional amendments that would transfer some
state legislative powers to the federal government to aid in post-war
reconstruction.22 The amendments were to remain in effect for five
years from the end of Australia's engagement in the Second World War.
One part of the proposal, designed apparently to mollify those who
feared the amendment would allow the imposition of a socialist
programme by greatly increasing governmental power, prevented both
state and federal governments from making "any law for abridging the
freedom of speech or expression." Another clause would have extended
18 Constitutional Commission, Report of theAdvisoty Committee on Individual and Democratic
Rights (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1987).
19 Part I of the Constitution Ac 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11.
20 Constitutional Commission, Final Report (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing
Service, 1988) at 445-592.
21 id. at 592-617.
22 Constitutional Alteration (Post-War Reconstruction and Democratic Rights) Bill 1944 (Cth).
See Galligan, supra note 17 at 348-50 for the background to this legislation.
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the guarantee of religious tolerance in section 116 of the Constitution to
the states. The proposals, which were voted upon as a package, were
decisively defeated at the referendum.23
The second attempt to insert fuller guarantees of rights into the
Constitution occurred in 1988. In a hasty and politically clumsy bid to
achieve constitutiohial change during the bicentenary celebrations of
white settlement in Australia, the Labor government submitted four
proposals to the referendum. These proposals included some of the
recommendations of the Constitutional Commission relating to the
extension of existing rights. The Commonwealth Constitutional
Alteration (Rights and Freedoms) Bill 1988 would have extended the right
to trial by jury, to freedom of religion, and to fair terms for
governmental acquisition of property by the states. All four referendum
proposals were defeated, with the rights proposal receiving the least
support of all at 31 per cent. This figure also represents the lowest level
of support for any referendum proposal ever put to the Australian
electorate.24
The Australian suspicion of constitutionally entrenched rights
has been enduring. It has been supported by arguments that
constitutional rights could both politicize the judiciary and legalize
public policy, thus undermining our legal culture. The suspicion also
rests on regional instincts of preserving states' rights. At a more
fundamental level, reservations about rights are linked to a utilitarian
confidence in our existing governmental structure.
B. Common Law Protection of Rights
The quality of the protection granted to individual rights by the
Australian common law is often cited as a reason for resisting a
constitutional entrenchment of rights,25 despite its vulnerability to
legislative change. But, the common law has traditionally regarded
individual rights as residual and has provided for their protection only
indirectly. This has been done chiefly through developing institutional
principles such as the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary,
procedural guarantees such as those found in administrative law, and
23 G. Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law 1929-1949 (Melbourne: Melbourne
University Press, 1963) at 171-73.
24 See Galligan, supra note 17.
2 5 P. Durack & R. Wilson, "Do We Need a New Constitution for the Commonwealth?" (1967)
41 Austl. L.J. 231 at 242.
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principles of statutory interpretation 6 These common law principles
have not generally been utilized to support substantive individual rights
in Australia. Again, while the considerable legislative extension of
administrative law has offered greater protection from the arbitrary
administrative process, it has not touched the substance of governmental
action.2 7
For most of its life, the Australian High Court has taken a
narrow, legalistic approach to the protection of common law rights. In
the Australian Communist Party v. Commonwealth,28 the High Court
declared invalid federal legislation abolishing the Australian Communist
Party and making connection with it a crime. By contrast, a
contemporary United States Supreme Court decision on comparable
legislation upheld its validityP9 The Australian decision has been
interpreted as an example of how reliance on the rule of law can operate
to protect individual rightsi0 ° The judgments, however, were cast almost
completely in a federal/state idiom. The legislation was ruled invalid
because it went beyond the assigned federal power to legislate for the
naval and military defence of Australia. The Court did not regard the
substance of the legislation as antithetical to the rule of law. Various
judges pointed out that the legislatures of the Australian states, which
hold residual legislative power, could validly abolish a political party.31
In other cases, the High Court has been reluctant to develop
common law protection of human rights. For example, in Dugan v.
Mirror Newspapers Ltd.32 a prisoner's right to bring a civil action for libel
was denied on the basis of a common law rule, which was extended to
the colony of New South Wales by English statute in 1828. This rule
precluded a civil action by a prisoner under a life sentence for a capital
felony. The majority viewed the historical fact of incorporation of the
attainder rule as the only relevant issue in the case. The dissenter,
Justice Murphy, argued that the courts have the duty to develop the
common law so that it keeps pace with other developments, particularly
2 6 B. Gaze & M. Jones, Law, Liberty and Australian Democracy (North Ryde, N.S.W.: Law
Book Co., 1990) at 30-32.
271bid. at 31.
28 (1951), 83 CL.R. 1.
2 9 Dennis v. U.S. (1950), 341 U.S. 494.
30 E. Campbell & H. Whitmore, Freedom in Australia, 2d ed. (Sydney: Sydney University
Press, 1973) at 239.
31 Supra note 28 at 152,199, and 242.
32 (1979), 142 C.L.R. 583.
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international human rights standards.3 3 In Mclnnis v. R.3 4 the High
Court refused special leave to appeal to a man who had been left
without representation in a criminal trial because of the failure of his
application for legal aid. The majority held that the strength of the
evidence against the accused meant that representation would have had
no effect upon his convictions 5 The lack of an explicit legislative or
common law guarantee of the right to counsel in Australia was regarded
as conclusive. The dissenter, Justice Murphy, arguing on more general
principles, contended that the notions of justice and a fair trial should
imply a right to counsel.36
More recent cases indicate a greater judicial willingness to
consider the implications of particular decisions for human rights. In
Dietrich v. R, 37 whose facts were very similar to Mclnnis, the High Court
identified a common law right to a fair trial which, generally, is
compromised because the person charged with a serious offence lacks
legal representation.38 And in Davis v. Commonwealth39 the High Court
referred to the right to freedom of expression as a limit on the use of the
Commonwealth's incidental legislative power.4 The High Court's use of
the language of rights tends to be cautious and limited. It has been
prepared to infer the existence of particular, limited rights, such as
freedom of political communication, into the Constitution as the
consequence of that document's commitment to responsible government
and to the functioning of the states41 Some members of the Court have
33 Ibid. at 611.
34 (1979), 143 C.LR. 575 [hereinafter Mclnnis].
35 Ibid. at 580, 583, and 594.
36 Ibid. at 586-93.
37 (1992), 109 A.LR. 385.
3 8 Ibid. at 398, 417, 435, and 443. Members of the Court seemed reluctant to concede that this
decision directly overruled McInnis, although, as Justice Toohey noted, "the philosophy underlying
the judgments of the majority [in Mclnnis] is inimical to the applicant's case ..." Ibid. at 430.
39 (1988), 166 C.LRL 79 at 100 and at 116.
4 0 Australian Constitution, supra note 9 at s. 51(39). See also Attorney-General (U.K)v.
Heinemann Publishers (No. 2) (1988), 165 C.L.R. 30 at 45; Union Steamship Co. ofAustralia v.Klng
(1988), 166 C.L.R. 1 at 10.
41 See Nationwide News Ply. Ltd. v. Wills (1992), 108 A.L.R. 681; Australian Capital Television
Ply. LtdL v. Commonwealth (No. 2) (1992), 108 A.L.R. 577.
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emphasized, however, that there is no constitutional foundation to imply
general guarantees of fundamental rights and freedoms. 42
A clearer statement of intent to introduce notions of human
rights into the common law was made in the 1992 case Mabo v.
Queensland.43 At issue were the legal rights to land of the indigenous
inhabitants of certain Torres Strait Islands and the status of the common
law doctrine that, at the time of European settlement of Australia, its
territory was terra nuiius. In the leading judgment, Justice Brennan said:
In discharging its dutyto declare the common law of Australia, this court is not free to
adopt rules that accord with contemporary notions of justice and human rights if their
adoption would fracture the skeleton of principle which gives the body of our law its
shape and internal consistency.... [The Australian legal system] can be modified to bring
it into conformity with contemporary notions of justice and human rights, but it cannot be
destroyed. ... [However] no case can command unquestioning adherence if the rule it
expresses seriously offends the values of justice and human rights (especially equality
before the law) which are aspirations of the contemporary Australian legal system."4
He went on to describe the terra nuius doctrine as based on "a
discriminatory denigration of indigenous inhabitants, '45 "frozen in an
age of racial discrimination" and unable to be sustained as a modern
common law principle.46 Justice Brennan's analysis of the common law
was based in large measure on international law, which he held to be "a
legitimate and important influence on the development of the common
law, especially when international law declares the existence of universal
human rights. '47 However, the uncertain ambit of his qualification that
the "skeletal principle[s]" of the Australian legal system had to be
preserved, whatever their implication for fundamental rights and
freedoms,48 reduces the radical potential of Justice Brennan's argument.
42 See ACTV v. Commonwealth (1992), 108 C.LR. 577 at 592, Mason C.J. In a speech
delivered a short time after this judgment, a member of the High Court, Justice Toohey, speculated
whether "the courts should ... conclude that where the people of Australia, in adopting a
constitution, conferred power to legislate upon a Commonwealth government, it is to be presumed
that they did not intend that those grants of power extend to the invasion of fundamental common
law liberties." TheAge (10 October 1992) at 9. This suggestion of an "implied bill of rights" created
considerable controversy, and a stem rebuke from Senator Tate, the federal Justice Minister. See
TheAge (10 October 1992) at 9.
43 (1992), 107 A.LR. 1.
44 Ibid. at 18-19.
4 5 ]bid. at 27.
46 1bid. at 28.
47 1bid. at 29.
4 8 1bid.
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C. Proposals for Legislative Bills of Rights
Over the last twenty years there have been various attempts to
introduce federal legislation guaranteeing individual rights, almost
entirely at the initiative of Labor governments. 49 Immediately after the
election of the Labor government in 1972, Australia signed the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights5 0 and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.51 In
order for Australia to observe the terms of the Civil and Political Rights
Covenant,5 2 the new government argued that certain individual rights
must receive explicit legal recognition. In 1973 a Human Rights Bill was
introduced into Parliament by the Attorney-General (and later High
Court Justice), Lionel Murphy. In the second reading speech, the
Attorney-General described his final aim as the amendment of the
Australian Constitution to provide for individual liberties, and implied
that the legislation was a prelude to this.53 The Human Rights Bill
defined fundamental rights and freedoms in terms virtually identical to
the Civil and Political Rights Covenant. It included individual rights to
non-discrimination; equal protection of the laws; freedom of thought,
expression, and movement; and the right to vote, to privacy, and to
certain procedural rights. Certain rights were explicitly circumscribed.
The right to freedom of expression, for example, was made subject to
limitations of respect for others' reputations; of national security and
public health; of regulation of time, place, and manner; and of
prevention of involuntary exposure to offensive matter.
The draft legislation purported to bind both federal and state
49 In discussing the partisan nature of the Australian debate over bills of rights, Brian Galligan
points to the apparent paradox of the Labor party's concern with rights and the antipathy of the
conservative Liberal party to them. One might expect that the latter's philosophy of individualism
would make that party more receptive to constitutional entrenchment of rights, while the Labor
party's "traditional collective concerns and statist strategy" sit awkwardly with its commitment to
individual liberties. Supra note 17 at 345 and at 356.
50 16 December 1966, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 47, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.LM. 368 [hereinafter Civil
and Political Rights Covenant].
51 16 December 1966,99 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Economic Covenant].
52 The obligation of implementation in the Economic Covenant is phrased in weaker language
than in the Civil and Political Rights Covenant. Article 2 provides that a party will undertake "steps
... to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full
realisation of the rights recognised ... by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption
of legislative measures." The Economic Covenant was ratified by Australia in 1976, without
reservations, but no specific legislation has implemented its provisions.
5 3 Australia, Parliament, Senate Debates (21 November 1973).
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governments. Federal laws inconsistent with the human rights
legislation were deemed to be inoperative unless they expressly declared
that they would operate in spite of the legislation. State laws
inconsistent with the legislation would be invalid because of section 109
of the Constitution, which provides for the supremacy of federal laws.
An Australian Human Rights Commissioner was to be in charge of the
investigation of actual or imminent infringements of human rights,
prompted either by a complaint or on the Commissioner's own initiative.
The Commissioner's powers included securing a settlement of the
complaint and bringing an action against the offender in the Australian
Industrial Court. An aggrieved individual could also bring a court action
directly. The Court had the power to make a declaration that a
particular action violated the legislation and could grant a variety of
remedies, including injunctive measures and the award of damages.
The Human Rights Bill attracted considerable controversy. After
its second reading speech in November 1973, the Bill was not further
debated. It lapsed with the prorogation of Parliament in early 1974 and
was not reintroduced in the new parliamentary session.
The Fraser Liberal-National Coalition government (1975-1983)
finally ratified the two Human Rights Covenants. The Economic
Covenant was ratified in 1976, the Civil and Political Rights Covenant in
1980. The Fraser government insisted that there was no need for a
comprehensive bill of rights to implement the latter, on the grounds that
"[h]aving regard to the existence of such safeguards as the common law,
statutory and procedural remedies ... the system of representative and
responsible government, the rule of law, the independence of the
judiciary and the freedom of the press, Australia is already in substantial
conformity with the Covenant. ' '54 To deal with the few areas that it
conceded did require attention, the government drafted legislation,
which provided solely administrative remedies for violation of rights
recognized in various international instruments. After two false starts,55
the Human Rights Commission Act was enacted in 1981. The Act
contained a sunset clause limiting the life of the Commission to five
years.5 6
TheAct was very limited. It applied only to actions of the federal
government. The Commission's ultimate sanction after investigation of
54 Australia, Parliament, Senate Debates (25 September 1979) at 918.
55 The government introduced a Human Rights Commission Bill into Parliament in 1977, and a
revised bill in 1979. For an account of these developments see Bailey, supra note 14 at 107-111.
56IJbid at s. 36(1).
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a human rights complaint was reporting it to the Attorney-General. The
rationale for this modest mechanism was that the most effective
protection of human rights came from drawing the legislature's attention
to them and that parliamentary scrutiny of complaints about
infringements of human rights enabled it to modify the law to deal with
the violations. The" Labor Party criticized theAct as a "toothless tiger"
and called for a judicially enforceable bill of rights.
57
A second attempt to enact a bill of rights was made in 1983 on
the return of a Labor government to power. As with the Murphy
Human Rights Bill, this draft legislation was regarded as a precursor to
constitutional amendment.58 The new Attorney-General, Senator
Gareth Evans, described his proposals for a legislative bill of rights as a
generalized version of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant. His
legislation was to differ from the 1973 Murphy Bill in that it would
recognize rights of "limited justiciability." 59 "What I have in mind," he
said, "is the use of the Bill of Rights in the courts not so much as an
aggressive weapon in its own right, but rather as an aid to the
interpretation of existing rules." According to the Attorney-General,
the legal role of the proposed legislation in protecting individual rights
would be "a shield, not a sword." 60
The federal government's anxiety to minimize controversy was
evident in Senator Evans' description of the legislation. He
distinguished it from the 1973 Human Rights Bill, whose provisions, he
said, were "just too vague and far-reaching. '61 Though he referred to
the new draft as "a dynamic social document," he argued that:
[t]he kind of Bill of Rights which is likely to gain most ready acceptance, and which would
arouse least fears from both within and outside the legal profession about the capacity
and appropriateness of the judiciary to handle it, would be one where the guarantees laid
down had effect only as "rules of construction."62
The definition of the rights protected by the draft legislation
generally followed the scheme of the Human Rights Bill of 1973 and the
Civil and Political Rights Covenant. The rights were set out in the portion
5 7 See Australia, Parliament, Senate Debates (8 and 13 November 1979) at 2093 and at 2213.
58 Attorney-General, Press Release (7 July 1983).
59 J. Faine & M. Pearce, "An Interview with Gareth Evans: Blueprints for Reform" (1983) 8
Leg. Services Bulletin 117 at 118.
60 bid.
61 Quoted in TheAge (26 October 1983).
6 2 Attorney-General, Press Release (7 July 1983).
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of the legislation styled "The Bill of Rights." The remainder of the
legislation dealt with the interpretation, operation, and enforcement of
the Bill of Rights, creating a complex and indirect scheme. Protection
was to be secured in three distinct ways. First, the Bill of Rights would
be an interpretative guide for the judiciary in the case of ambiguous
provisions of federal and state legislation; the draft stated that "a
construction that is not in conflict with the Bill of Rights or that would
further the objects of this Act, shall be preferred to any other
construction." Second, the status of the Bill of Rights itself was declared
to be that of a federal law. Its provisions would automatically prevail
over prior federal legislation and, by virtue of section 109 of the
Constitution, over all prior and subsequent state legislation.
Subsequently enacted federal legislation could, however, validly declare
that its provisions were to operate notwithstanding the Bill of Rights.
Third, rights were protected by administrative procedures. The
legislation would enable the Human Rights Commission to investigate
complaints about federal or state governmental actions apparently
violating the Bill of Rights. The Commission's powers to resolve
complaints included conciliation, settlement, and report to Parliament
through the Attorney-General. Unlike the 1973 Human Rights Bill, the
1984 Bill of Rights Bill gave the Commission no power to seek a judicial
determination of any complaint.
The "shield not sword" epithet given to the legislation by its
drafters was a reference to its explicit provision that the Bill of Rights
conferred no right of civil action nor imposed any criminal liability for
the infringement of a protected right. Apart from invocation of the Bill
of Rights as a device in the interpretation of statutes, the only individual
initiative possible under the legislation was application to the Federal
Court for a declaration that a federal or state law was in conflict with the
Bill of Rights, and therefore deemed repealed or inoperative. This
course, however, was unavailable if the applicant was a party to
proceedings arising under the impugned legislation in which the alleged
infringement of rights could be relevant.
The legislative proposals were thus far weaker than those
presented to Parliament in 1973. They applied only to governmental
action whereas the earlier Human Rights Bill had extended to any action
that infringed protected rights. Moreover, the rights would be relevant
only as a modest interpretative aid in an action arising out of legislation
that allegedly infringed protected rights, and the legislation's validity
could be challenged by a person only if no action had been taken against
him or her under it. The proposed legislation did not exploit the
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Commonwealth government's (by then) clear legislative power to
implement international treaties. 63
A controversy over the proposed legislation, fuelled by
arguments of "states' rights," and the calling of an early federal election
in December 1984, made the Labor government less eager to proceed
with this legislative project. Indeed the Evans Bill was never introduced
into Parliament. Although the Labor Party won the election, Prime
Minister Hawke signalled his intention to take a less controversial line
on human rights issues by moving Attorney-General Evans, the most
consistent proponent of an Australian Bill of Rights, to another ministry.
Evans was replaced by Lionel Bowen, who had publicly questioned the
need for human rights legislation.
Bowen's apparent lack of enthusiasm for any type of legislative
bill of rights was temporary. In May 1985 the new Attorney-General
announced that a revised bill of rights Bill would be brought before the
federal Parliament. It was introduced into Parliament along with a Bill
establishing a Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. 64
The Bowen Bill followed the structure of the Evans Bill, but the latter's
force was considerably attenuated by a revision of the provisions dealing
with its operation. The Bill of Rights itself was still deemed to take
precedence over other laws, but only with respect to federal common law
and federal legislation enacted after the Bill was passed. Only federal
legislation was required to be interpreted in accordance with the Bill of
Rights. All state common and statutory law was expressly removed from
its operation. The Bowen Bill also completely removed the already very
restricted possibility for an individual to seek a declaration that
particular legislation infringed the Bill of Rights. The powers of the
Human Rights Commission remained the same under the Bowen Bill
and included the investigation of and reporting to Parliament about
alleged infringements of the Bill of Rights by a state.
Despite the extremely limited nature of human rights protection
offered by the Bowen Bill, it caused great controversy in its passage
through Parliament.65 The legislation was eventually allowed to lapse in
March 1986. Its companion legislation establishing the Human Rights
and Equal Opportunity Commission was, however, finally enacted.
6 3 ICoowarla v. Bjelke Petersen (1982), 153 C.L.R. 168 [hereinafter Koowarta]; Commonwealth
v. Tasmania (1983), 158 C.L.R. 1 [hereinafter Tasmanian Dam]. See below at 212.
6 4 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Bill 1986 (Cth).
65 See Bailey, supra note 14 at 55.
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The progressively weaker form of the successive attempts to
obtain a legislative bill of rights in Australia was due in large part to
federal pressures. A recurring constraint on the introduction of an
Australian bill of rights has been the nature of Australian federalism.
One of the most persuasive arguments against the inclusion of individual
rights in the Australian Constitution at federation was that they would
usurp the power of the states. So too more recently, a bill of rights has
been described as inimical to the federal system.66 Some of the states
predicted a dismantling of the federation because of the erosion of their
rights. One effect of the guarantee of equal suffrage in the 1984
proposed Bill of Rights, for example, would have been to allow judicial
scrutiny of state electoral boundaries. This created fears in Queensland
that the federal government would attempt to enforce a "one vote-one
value" system in electoral divisions, thus replacing a zonal system (said
to ensure adequate representation of underpopulated rural areas). 6 7
Another specific anxiety over the 1984 proposals was that the Human
Rights Commission, a federal agency, would be empowered to examine
proposed state legislation and call state officials before it.68 The 1984
draft was also described as interfering with the criminal justice systems
of the states and other essential aspects of their decision making. 69 The
states raised no objections to the successfully enacted Human Rights
Commission Act of 1981 precisely because it did not impinge on state
legislation.7 0
The contention and failure of all the proposals for an Australian
bill of rights were caused by concerns that they would disturb the
democratic process and the status quo. What was missing from the
debate was recognition that the traditional elements of Australian legal
and political culture ignore minority concerns. The recent revival of the
bill of rights debate, in the context of constitutional reform proposals
generated by the centenary of the Australian Constitution in 2001, has
put the concern of minority protection squarely on the agenda.71
6 6 RtD. Lumb,Australian Constitutionalism (Sydney: Butterworths, 1983) at 142-43.
6 7Australian FinancialReview (12 November 1984).
68 TheAge (24 October 1984).
69 TheAge (1 May 1985).
70 Bailey, supra note 14 at 109.
71 See G. Brennan, "The Impact of a Bill of Rights on the Role of the Judiciary: An
Australian Response" (Paper delivered at the Conference on Australia and Human Rights: Where
to From Here?, Centre for International and Public Law, Australian National University, 15-17 July
1992) [unpublished].
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D. Legislative Protection of Rights
The Australian Constitution assigns specified concurrent
legislative powers to the Commonwealth government, and the residue to
the states. It apparently allocates exclusive legislative competence over
many human rights matters to the states.72 Indeed the first Australian
legislation prohibiting discrimination was the South Australian
Prohibition of Discrimination Act of 1966. A series of High Court
decisions in the 1980s73 indicated, however, that the Commonwealth
government had power to implement international obligations, such as
those arising under a treaty or at customary international law, under its
power to legislate "with respect to ... external affairs. '74 This has
allowed the Commonwealth to legislate with respect to discrimination
based on race,7s sex,76 or disability,77and with respect to human rights
generally. 78 Commonwealth privacy legislation has been enacted under
the federal incidental power.
79
Before the extent of the external affairs power was judicially
confirmed, the Commonwealth government was occasionally prepared
to invoke other legislative powers, particularly the power to make laws
72 One exception is the federal power to make laws with respect to the people of any race:
Australian Constitution, supra note 9 at s. 51(26). The original intention of this provision was to
allow the Commonwealth to legislate to exclude Kanaks who were imported as "coolie" labour on
Queensland sugar plantations. J. Quick & R. Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian
Commonwealth (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1901) at 622-3.
73 Koowarta, supra note 63; Tasmanian Dam, supra note 63. See also, Richardson v. Forestry
Commission of Tasmania (1988), 164 C.LR. 261.
7 4 Australian Constitution, supra note 9 at s. 51(29).
75 RacialDiscrimination Act 1975 (Cth) (implementing the UN Convention on the Elimination
of all Forms of Race Discrimination 1963) (Oh) [hereinafter Racial Discrimination Act].
76 Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) (implementing the UN Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 1979). The Act goes further than the terms of the
Convention in covering discrimination against men on the grounds of sex. In these respects it
depends on various other Commonwealth legislative powers including the corporations, banking,
insurance, and trade and commerce powers [Australian Constitution, supra note 9 at ss. 51(20), (13),
(14), and (1)].
7 7 Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth).
7 8 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) [implementing the Civil
and Political Rights Covenant 1966, ILO Convention No 111-Discrimination (Employment and
Occupation) 1958, the UN Declaration on the Rights of the Child 1959, the UN Declaration on the
Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons 1971 and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Disabled
Persons 1975] (Cth).
79 PrivacyAct 1988 (Cth). This legislation was in part designed to fulfil Australia's obligations
under Article 17 of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant. See Bailey, supra note 14 at 275-6.
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with respect to "the people of any race for whom it is deemed necessary
to make special laws" 80 to interfere directly in states where clear
violations of human rights had occurred. In Queensland, for example,
Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders were subject to a variety of
restrictions with respect to holding property, maintaining residence, and
working on reserves.81 In 1975, after negotiations with Queensland to
amend the law failed, the Commonwealth government passed the
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders (Queensland Discriminatory Laws)
Act.82 Its preamble declared its aim as "preventing discrimination in
certain respects ... under the laws of Queensland." The legislation
directly contradicted many of the provisions of the Queensland
legislation and was a rare confrontation with a regional unit by a centre
traditionally deferential to regional treatment of human rights.
83
The development of the Commonwealth external affairs power
has been strongly resisted because of its reduction of the legislative
spheres of the states. The dissenting judgments in both Koowarta and
Tasmanian Dam strongly expressed state concerns. They argued that the
nature of federation required limiting the external affairs power as a
basis for Commonwealth legislation to matters clearly within federal
legislative competence. In Koowarta, Chief Justice Gibbs warned that
"[t]he distribution of powers made by the Constitution could in time be
completely obliterated; there would be no field of power which the
Commonwealth could not invade, and the federal balance achieved by
the Constitution could be entirely destroyed."'8 4 While High Court
majorities have decisively rejected such arguments, the Commonwealth
government has been reluctant to fully exploit the legislative potential of
its external affairs power to protect human rights due to political
pressure from the states.85
80 Australian Constitution, supra note 9 at s. 51(26).
81 See generally, G. Nettheim, Out Lawed: Queensland'sAborigines and Islanders and the Rule
of Law (Sydney: Australia and New Zealand Book Co., 1973).
82 See also, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders (Queensland Reserves and Communities Self
Management) Act 1978 (Cth).
83 Compare Queensland Electricity Commission v. Commonwealth (1985), 159 C.L.R. 192,
where federal legislation designed to override state legislation that implicated international human
rights standards of workers was held invalid on the ground that it placed a discriminatory special
burden on Queensland.
8 4 Koowarta, supra note 63 at 168.
85 The Australian Parliament's bipartisan Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and
Trade has recently recommended a bolder use of the external affairs power in relation to
international human rights obligations. Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade,A
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The ambit of Australian human rights legislation generally is
limited in scope. It operates only within a public sphere of activity, it
deals mainly with individual complaints and remedies; and many of the
concepts it relies on, such as "discrimination" or "merit," are defined to
promise very limited forms of equalityl 6 The limitations of Australia's
anti-discrimination legislation prevent it from extending to major sites of
discrimination. Likewise, the assumption that the role of discrimination
law is to deal with only anomalous, irrational discrimination masks the
reality of structural discrimination.
Moreover, the Australian approach to human rights protection is
much weaker and more attenuated than that in Canada. An initial
problem in Australia has been the polarization of the major political
parties with respect to rights. Most initiatives on rights have come from
the Labor Party and have been strongly resisted by the Liberal-National
Coalition.8 7 This has led to significant amendment of draft legislation in
the 'Senate, which has been controlled for long periods by the
conservative parties. For example, the Racial Discrimination Bill 1974
was amended by the Senate, which was then controlled by the
Opposition Liberal-National Party Coalition, to remove provisions
relating to incitement and promotion of racial hatred, to increase the
burden of proof with respect to claims of discrimination, and to weaken
the powers of the Commissioner for Community Relations to enforce
the legislation.88 The Sex Discrimination Bill was amended in the Senate
to except religious institutions from the prohibition of discrimination in
job selection.
89
A second cause of Commonwealth human rights law's weakness
is its deference to the pressures of federalism. As we have seen, the
Human Rights Commission Act of 1981 excluded state legislation from its
scope. So, too, the 1986 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
Commission Act affects only the acts of the Commonwealth government.
The sole exception to this is Division 4 of the Act, implementing
International Labour Organization Convention 111 on Discrimination in
Review of Australia's Efforts to Promote and Protect Human Rights (Canberra: Australian
Government Publishing Service, 1992) at 30. The shadow Attorney-General, Peter Costello,
however, refused to endorse a role for the external affairs power in overriding state laws that violate
human rights. See TheAge (10 December 1992).
86 See generally, M. Thornton, The Liberal Promise of Anti-Discrimination Legislation in
Australia (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1990); and Gaze & Jones, supra note 26 at 408-12.
87 See Galligan, supra note 17.
88 See "Australian Practice in International Law 1974-1975" (1974-1975) 6 Austl. Y.B. Int'l L.
189 at 309.
89 Bailey, supra note 14 at 152.
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Respect of Employment and Occupation, which covers state and territorial
practices. The essentially recommendatory nature of the Human Rights
and Equal Opportunity Commission's activities does not make this a
significant inroad on state or territorial powers. The Sex Discrimination
Act does not apply to employment practices of the states or self-
governing territories or their instrumentalities,90 although it precludes
discrimination in the implementation of Commonwealth laws or
programmes, even when these are administered by a stateY1 The Racial
Discrimination Act, by contrast, binds state governments fully.92
Given the wide interpretation of the external affairs power by the
Australian High Court, there is no constitutional reason why all
Commonwealth human rights legislation cannot bind the states and
create uniform national standards of human rights protection. 93 One
problem of the limited nature of Commonwealth human rights laws is
that employees of the Tasmanian and Northern Territory governments
have considerably fewer remedies for discrimination than other
Australian workersY4 Moreover, the co-existence and overlap of federal
and state or territorial anti-discrimination legislation leads to complex
jurisdictional choices for complainants.95 These concerns are mitigated
90 Sex Discrimination Act, supra note 76 at ss. 9 and at 13. The exclusion of state employment
from the Se; Discrimination Act is sometimes attributed to the principle of the Melbourne
Corporation v. Commonwealth (1947), 74 C.L.R. 31 [hereinafter Melbourne Corporation], which
prohibited use of Commonwealth legislative power to interfere directly with the internal business of
a state government. Human rights standards are by definition restrictive, but it seems curious to
regard them as an unwarranted burden on state activity in the same way that a proposed federal
right of veto over state banking was held to be in Melbourne Corporation. Moreover, it is unclear
why the Melbourne Corporation principle applies to sex discrimination legislation but not to race
discrimination legislation.
9 1 Sex Discrimination Act, ibid at s. 26.
92 Supra note 75 at s. 6.
93 See supra note 73.
94 An anti-discrimination bill was introduced into the Northern Territory Parliament in
November 1992. A draft Tasmanian anti-discrimination legislation was reintroduced as a private
member's bill in April 1992.
95 The grounds of illegal discrimination under Commonwealth and state or territorial laws
vary considerably. See Thornton, supra note 86 at c. 3; R. Hunter, "Equal Opportunity Law
Reform" (1991) 4 Austl. J. Lab. L. 226 at 230-3. The issue of inconsistency between
Commonwealth and state anti-discrimination legislation had been raised in Viskauskas v. Niland
(1983), 153 C.L.R. 280; and University of Wollongong v. Metwally (1984), 158 C.L.R. 447. In both
cases the High Court had struck down state legislation that covered the same area as the Racial
Discrimination Act under section 109 of the Constitution, which makes a state law inconsistent with
a Commonwealth law invalid. To cope with this problem, under both the Racial Discrimination Act
(s. 6A) and the Sex Discrimination Act (ss. 10-11), a complainant must now opt to use either state or
Commonwealth law. If state law is chosen, no subsequent recourse can be had to the federal
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somewhat in practice by cooperative arrangements between the Human
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission and the state agencies
responsible for administering equal opportunity laws. This allows a state
agency to handle all human rights issues initially and to refer only those
within the federal body's jurisdiction, and vice versa.96
A third deficiency in much state and Commonwealth human
rights legislation is the practice of exempting various areas of activity
from their scope 1 7 For example, a major area for discrimination,
industrial awards, remains outside the federal Sex Discrimination Act.98
Legislation has been recently introduced into federal Parliament to
extend the coverage of the Act,99 but this will only affect prospective
awards. Combat and combat-related duties in the Defence Force are
exempt,100 as are the admission and servicing of members of voluntary
bodies1 °1 and many sporting activities.102 Both the Sex Discrimination
Act and the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act
exempt the employment of staff of religious educational institutions
from their scope if the discrimination is "in good faith in order to avoid
injury to the religious susceptibilities of adherents of that religion or
legislation (to remove any doubts about the consistency of the legislation). If the federal law is
selected, this dbes not preclude later reliance on state legislation. These provisions do not, however,
prevent problems of inconsistency in legislation. In Dao v.Australian Postal Commission (1987), 162
C.L.R. 317, the High Court found a direct inconsistency between the Commonwealth Postal Services
Act 1977 and the New South Wales Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 because the federal legislation
gave a wide discretion to the Postal Commission to appoint employees. See also AMP Society v.
Goulden (1986), E.O.C. 92-164. For narrower approaches to inconsistency between federal and
state human rights legislation see Duncan v. Commonwealth Banking Corp. (1985), 12 I.R. 198; and
Gerhardy v. Brown (1985), 159 C.L.R. 70.
96 Bailey, supra note 14 at 120-22. In some cases, however, complainants are required to
choose whether to proceed under state or federal legislation because of a concern by agencies to be
seen to be acting impartially.
97 A recent critique of many of the exemptions in the context of federal sex discrimination
legislation is found in a report: Australia, Sex Discrimination Commission, Report on Review of
Permanent Exemptions Under the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Canberra: Australian Government
Publishing Service, 1992) (Commissioner: Q. Bryce).
98 Supra note 76 at s. 40(1).
99 Sex Discrimination and Other Legislation Amendment Act 1992 [hereinafter Sex
Discrimination Amendment Bill]. Legislation has recently been enacted by the Federal Parliament.
1 0 0 Ibid. at s. 43.
1 01 Ibid. at s. 39.
1 02 Ibid. at s. 42.
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creed."103 State legislation contains even wider lists of exemptions.10 4
Another problem with Commonwealth human rights legislation
is its indirect method of enforcement. With respect to issues of human
rights generally, section 11 of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
Commission Act empowers the Commission, among other things, to
examine federal or territorial legislation to determine whether it is
inconsistent with the human rights set out in the Civil and PoliticalRights
Covenant and the declarations attached to theAct.105 The Commission
can also inquire into federal or territorial acts or practices that may be
inconsistent with these human rights and attempt conciliation of the
matter giving rise to the inquiry. It can promote understanding of these
rights generally, undertake research and educational programmes for
the Commonwealth on human rights matters and intervene, with the
leave of the court, in court proceedings involving human rights issues.106
The Commission's strongest sanction in its general human rights
activities is its power to report to the Attorney-General. Its work cannot
be directly or indirectly enforced by the courts. The Commission and its
predecessor have done valuable work in investigating and settling human
rights complaints 10 7 and particularly, in researching and reporting on
general human rights issues.108 However, there has been very little
governmental response to this research.
The Commission also has the function of administering the race,
sex, and disability discrimination legislation as well as the 1988 Privacy
Act. The primary mode of dispute resolution under the discrimination
legislation is conciliation. While conciliation has the advantages of
economy, confidentiality, informality, flexibility, and the avoidance of an
103 Sex Discrimination Act, supra note 76 at s. 38; Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
Commission Act 1986, supra note 78 at s. 3(1).
104 See Hunter, supra note 95 at 230-3.
105 Proposed legislation can be examined only at the request of the Attorney-General.
106 See Re Jane (1988), 94 F.LR. 1; Re Marion (1990), 14 Fam LR. 427 (H.C.); R. v. Cheung
Ymg Lin (N.S.W. Sup. Ct. 1992, unreported); and Mt. Isa Mines Ltd. v. Marks (1992), E.O.C. 92-420.
107 Bailey, supra note 14 at 123-29. The most common issues of complaint to the Human
Rights Commission in the general human rights field were immigration and deportation. Ibid. at
114 and at 23.
10 8 A list of the Human Rights Commission's reports is contained in ibid., Appendix 1. Three
major reports of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission are Report of the Inquiry
into the Social and Material Needs of the Residents of Toomelah, Goondiwindi and Boggabilla
(Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Government, 1988); Our Homeless Children
(Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1989); and the Report of the National Inquiy
into Racist Violence in Australia (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1991). A
report on the human rights of people with mental illness will be published in June 1993.
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adversarial resolution of disputes, it works best when the parties have
similar bargaining power. 109 Some observers have argued that, in the
context of discrimination law, conciliation may reinforce inequality.110
So, too, while the confidentiality and informality of its procedures may
encourage complainants to use the legislation, they preclude public
scrutiny and offer a "privatized" form of justice.11 Moreover, the final
outcome cannot be directly enforced under federal law.112 Thus if
conciliation is not successful, the Commission has the power to make a
recommendation on complaints but the determination does not bind the
parties." 3 To enforce a Commission determination, proceedings must
begin in the Federal Court, and the matter is heard anew by the Court,
which is not bound by any findings of fact made by the Commission.1 14
In a reform announced in December 1992, the federal government
introduced legislation to make Commission determinations registrable
in the Federal Court. In the absence of an application to review the
determination, the determination will become enforceable as an order of
the Federal Court.1s
A fourth concern with legislative human rights protection in
Australia is the generally restrictive interpretation of human rights
legislation by tribunals and courts. For example, attempts have been
made to persuade Australian courts to give some force to the text of the
international instruments appended to the predecessor to the Human
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act. In Kioa v. Minister for
109 M. Thornton, "Equivocations of Conciliation: The Resolution of Discrimination
Complaints in Australia" (1989) 52 Mod. L. Rev. 733 at 743-6.
110 Gaze & Jones, supra note 26 at 427.
111 Thornton, supra note 109 at 741-2. At 754, Thornton also points to "creeping legalism" in
conciliation procedures. He cites, for example, the application of the rules of natural justice to the
conduct of compulsory conciliation conferences in Koppen v. Commissioner for Community Relations
(1986), 11 F.C.R. 360.
112 The High Court decision in the R. v. Kirby (1956), 94 C.L.R. 254, required the separation
in federal bodies of judicial and other powers. This has been thought to preclude a non-judicial
body from making binding determinations. State legislation is not subject to the same constitutional
requirement of separation of powers.
113 Racial Discrimination Act, supra note 75 at s. 25ZA; and Sex Discrimination Act, supra note
76 at ss. 81(1), 82(1), and (2).
114 For example in Maynard v. Nielson (1987), E.O.C. 92-199, the Human Rights and Equal
Opportunity Commission made a finding of race discrimination when a Hobart hotel refused to
serve the Aboriginal complainant. when the complainant sought an order from the Federal Court
to enforce the Commission's award of damages, the Court overturned the Commission's findings on
the basis of new evidence [(1988), E.O.C. 92-226].
115 Sex Discrimination Amendment Bill, supra note 99.
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Immigration,116 the High Court rejected arguments that a Minister was
required to take the provisions of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant
and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of the Child117 into
account when making a decision about deportation.118 There are some
recent signs, however, that the High Court will be influenced by
international human rights law in its development of the common law.119
Over the past two years, the High Court has also interpreted
discrimination legislation in an expansive manner.1 20
Finally, Australian human rights legislation is fundamentally
limited in focus: it covers only the traditional canon of civil and political
rights. Our skewed distribution of wealth1 21 indicates major problems of
economic and social justice and the need for a guarantee of income
support to prevent poverty. The definition and recognition of economic
and social rights is a major task in the development of human rights in
Australia.
E. Australia and the International Law of Human Rights
The development of the external affairs power as a basis for
federal legislation has given the international law of human rights
particular significance in Australia. Australia's participation in
international human rights instruments has been strongly influenced by
its federal structure. The reluctance observed generally with respect to
entry into treaties in many federations 22 is evident also in Australian
practice, although in a more attenuated form than that found, for
example, in the United States. The Australian Constitution contains no
116 (1985), 159 C.L.R. 550.
117GA Res. 1386/45,20 Nov. 1959.
118 The status of international instruments annexed to legislation was discussed at length in Re
Marion (1990), 14 Fam L.R. 427.
119 For example, Dietrich v. R. (1992), 109 A.L.R. 385; and Mabo v. Queensland (1992), 107
A.L.R. 1. See also M. Kirby, "Implications for Australia of the Continuing Internationalisation of
Human Rights" (Paper delivered at Conference on Australia and Human Rights: Where to From
Here?, Centre for International and Public Law, Australian National University, 15-17 July 1992)
[unpublished].
120 Australian Iron & Steel v. Banovic (1989), E.O.C 92-271; Slater v. Brookton Famiers Co.op.
(1990), E.O.C. 92-321; and Waters v. Public Transport Corporation (1991), E.O.C. 92-390.
121 Sixty per cent of Australia's wealth is owned by 10 per cent of the population; over a
quarter of the wealth is held by 1 per cent of the population. Gaze & Jones, supra note 26 at 468.
122 See L. Wildhaber, Treaty-Making Power and Constitution (Basel: Helbing & Lichtenhahn,
1971) at 341.
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explicit grant of treaty-making power, but such a power is considered
inherent in the prerogatives of the Executive, which have devolved from
the Crown.123 From federation, however, the Commonwealth had acted
on the assumption that its power to implement treaties, especially of an
economic or humanitarian character, was limited by the federal division
of powers.124 A practice developed whereby the states were consulted by
the Commonwealth government on treaties whose subject matter fell
within state legislative power 25 The federal government would not
become a party to such treaties until it was satisfied that state laws were
in accordance with their requirements.126 These statements appeared to
accept that a refusal by even one state to amend a law inconsistent with
the requirements of a treaty, which the federal government wished to
ratify, was sufficient to prevent ratification. In 1942 the federal Minister
for External Affairs, Dr. Evatt, described Australia's record in ratifying
International Labour Organisation [ILO] Conventions as "acutely
disappointing" and argued that it was due to the recalcitrance of the
states. "It has been difficult to obtain their views with any degree of
despatch," he noted, "and practically impossible to secure unanimous
action." 127
When the Australian states were first consulted on the draft
United Nations Covenants on Human Rights, over most of whose
subject matter they retained direct legislative power, they tended to
react so as to preserve their full legislative domain. The Tasmanian
government, for example, insisted that the provisions in both Covenants,
extending their operation to all parts of a federation, were "entirely
unacceptable." And the Victorian government regarded the Covenants
as purporting to alter "the fundamental relationship between the federal
and constituent bodies under their own constitution." 128 The Australian
delegate to the Third Committee of the General Assembly predicted in
1950 that, "[flor the central government unilaterally to accept and ratify
the [Civil and Political] Covenant would not only be provocative to State
123 SecAustralian Constitution, supra note 9 at s. 61.
124 G. Docker, The Treaty-Making Power of the Commonwealth of Australia (The Hague: M.
Nijhoff, 1966) at 40-41, 60-64, and 182.
125 Ibid. at 109-11.
126 D. De Stoop, "Australia's Approach to International Treaties on Human Rights" (1970-
1973) 5 Austl. Y.B. Int'l L. 27 at 30.
127 Quoted in K. Bailey, "Australia and the International Labour Conventions" (1946) 54 Int'l
Lab. Rev. 285 at 290.
128 Quoted in Docker, supra note 124 at 224.
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feeling, but would be a breach of the whole spirit of the federation."129
Australia campaigned unsuccessfully to have a "federal" clause inserted
in the draft Covenant similar to that contained in Article 19(7) of the ILO
Constitution. It provided that the obligation of federal states with
respect to iLO Conventions and Recommendations was to refer them to
regional authorities for action when it regarded them as "appropriate
under its constitutional system ... for action by the constituent states ...
rather than for federal action."130 The Australian states' strong defence
of their legislative powers meant that the Commonwealth government's
practice of consultation and obtaining the consent of the states prior to
ratification produced, particularly in the area of human rights treaties,
"delays, misunderstandings and, in some cases, outright refusal to
cooperate with federal authorities. 131
The Whitlam Labor government, elected in 1972, announced a
commitment to ratify a variety of human rights agreements, including
the two Human Rights Covenants and the Race Discrimination
Convention, within a year of taking office.13 2 An implication of this
policy was that state cooperation was not essential for ratification. The
fate of the legislation designed to allow ratification of the Civil and
Political Rights Covenant, Lionel Murphy's Bill of Rights, has been
discussed above. The Race Discrimination Act was, however, eventually
enacted.
After the Labor government lost power in 1975, the perceived
demands of federalism were reasserted to limit Australia's
implementation of human rights conventions. The Commonwealth
government formally announced in 1977 a return to the pre-Whitlam
practice of extensive consultation with the states on treaties whose
implementation would touch on legislative areas "traditionally regarded
as being within the responsibility of the States."133 At the same time, it
was stated that Australia would seek federal clauses in treaties in
"appropriate cases." In 1979 the Ministerial Council on Human Rights,
comprising the Attorneys-General of the Commonwealth, the states, and
Northern Territory, was established as a forum for dealing with the
cooperative implementation of human rights agreements.
129 UN GAOR, 5th Sess., 3d Ctte. (1950) at 134.
130 UN ESCOR, 6th Sess., UN Doc. E/600, Supp. No. 1.
131 De Stoop, supra note 126 at 32.
132 Ibid.
133 Quoted in H. Burmester, "The Australian States and Participation in the Foreign Policy
Process" (1978) 9 Fed. L Rev. 257 at 281.
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The implications of the Fraser policy of state consultation for the
implementation of human rights agreements became clear when
Australia finally ratified the Civil and Political Rights Covenant in 1980,
announcing this as "an important achievement in the area of the
Government's Federalism Policy."'134 The instrument of ratification had
attached to it a list of "Reservations and Declarations" which affected a
third of the Covenant's provisions. One "reservation" was apparently
designed to protect Australia's federal structure in the implementation
of the Covenant; others related to specific provisions, most of which
would have had impact on the operation of the states' criminal justice
systems.
The "federal" reservation was drafted in a confusing and
contradictory way. Australia advised that it had a federal constitutional
system, and that it accepted that "the provisions of the Covenant
extend[ed] to all parts of Australia ... without any limitation or
exceptions." Since, however, the obligation to enforce the Covenant in
Article 2 refers to implementation "in accordance with [a State Party's]
constitutional processes," Australia argued that its federal constitutional
processes demanded that "the implementation of those provisions of the
Covenant over whose subject matter the authorities of the constituent
States exercise legislative, executive and judicial jurisdiction will be a
matter for those authorities." The Australian reservation undermined
the clearly intended meaning of both the implementation obligation in
Article 2 of the Covenant and Article 50, which extends the provisions of
the Covenant "to all parts of federal States without any limitations or
exceptions." It also breached the principle of treaty law that a party may
not invoke its internal law as justification for failure to perform a
treaty.135
After the re-election of a Labor government in 1983, most of
Australia's reservations and declarations to the Civil and Political Rights
Covenant were removed.136 The ratification still has attached to it a
"Declaration," which notes that the federal constitutional system in
134 Tabling Statement by the Attorney-General, 5 August 1980, quoted in G. Triggs,
"Australia's Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Endorsement
or Repudiation?" (1982) 31 Int'l & Comp. LQ. 278.
1 3 5 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, U.N. Doe. AICONF.39/27
(1969), 8 I.LM. 679, Art. 27.
136 Australia still has reservations to Article 10(2) and (3), relating to the segregation in
custody of accused and convicted persons and of juvenile and adult offenders; to Article 14(6),
relating to procedures for the payment of compensation for miscarriage of justice; and to Article 20,
relating to the prohibition of propaganda for war or advocacy of racial hatred.
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Australia will affect the domestic implementation of the Covenant. 137
Certainly since the Koowarta and Tasmanian Dam cases this
qualification has little basis in Australian law and suggests a curious and
inappropriate nostalgia for the past. Its status in international law is also
questionable.
The present Labor government has continued to seek the views
of the states before ratifying international human rights agreements, but
has stated that it will not tolerate unreasonable delays in treaty
participation. Australia has become a party to most recent United
Nations human rights conventions: the Convention on the Elimination of
all Forms of Discrimination Against Women of 1979, the Convention on
the Elimination of Torture of 1984, and the Convention on the Rights of the
Child of 1989.138 A "federal declaration" similar in terms to that
attached to the Civil and Political Rights Covenant accompanied
ratification of the Women's Convention. It is still possible for the states
to slow the signature, ratification or accession process down
considerably. Ratification of the Torture Convention took almost four
years because of state concerns about the effect it might have on state
laws; and the signature of the Children's Convention was delayed because
of state pressure. Australia was slow to accede to the First Optional
Protocol to the Civil and Political Rights Covenant, which would allow
individuals the right to make a direct complaint against Australia to the
Human Rights Committee, which supervises the implementation of the
Covenant, because of opposition by some states and territories, and in
particular because of concern about the impact of accession on their
prison systems.1 39
137 The Declaration set out in the Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary.Generalb
Status as of 31 Dec 1989,UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E8 (1990) states:
Australia has a federal constitutional system in which legislative, executive and judicial
powers are shared or distributed between the Commonwealth and the constituent States.
The implementation of the treaty throughout Australia will be effected by the
Commonwealth, State and Territory authorities having regard to their respective
constitutional powers and arrangements concerning their exercice.
138 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1 March
1980, Can. T.S. 1982 No. 31, 19 I.L.M. 33 [hereinafter Women's Convention]; Convention against
Torture and other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, Can.
T.S. 1984 No. 859, 23 I.L.M. 535 [hereinafter Torture Convention]; and Convention on the Rights of
the Child, 20 November 1989, U.N. Doe. A/RES/44/25 (1989), 28 I.L.M. 1448 [hereinafter Children's
Convention].
139 See H. Charlesworth, "Australia's Accession to the First Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" (1991) 18 Melbourne Univ. L. Rev. 481.
From 31 January 1993, Australia has accepted the optional complaints mechanisms under three
human rights conventions: Article 41 of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant, which allows states
to bring complaints against other states for violation of the Covenant; Article 14 of the Convention
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The politics of federalism have thus played a significant role in
Australia's acceptance of international human rights instruments.
"Federalism" has become a weasel word, allowing Australia to
rationalize its tardy participation and ambivalent implementation of
human rights agreements. 140
11. DEVELOPING HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION IN
AUSTRALIA
If the current structure of Australian human rights law is
lopsided and precarious, how can it be improved for the next century?
There is much room for development. For example, Donna
Greschner's 41 insistence on the need to rethink the paradigm at the
centre of. Canadian human rights legislation is directly applicable to
Australia also. Unless laws respond to the perspective of the oppressed
and tackle subordination by systems and institutions, they cannot work
any real change. I want, however, to consider a more general method of
improving the legal protection of rights in Australia-the introduction of
constitutionally entrenched guarantees of rights.
Supporters of constitutional guarantees of rights generally point
to the importance of protecting individual autonomy as the major
justification for rights guarantees. For example, Alexander Bickel
argued that the protection of individual rights is aimed at the support of
"enduring general values," one of the tasks of any good society. 42
Ronald Dworkin sees respect for human rights as based on a Kantian
recognition of the value of human dignity and a belief in the value of the
political equality of all citizens.143 Legal protection of human rights
on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Racial Discrimination, which allows individual complaints to the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; and Articles 21 and 22 of the Torture
Convention, which allow individual and state complaints for violation of the Convention. See The
Age (18 December 1992) at 4.
140 See Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, supra note 85 at 30: "...
Federal Governments have been as culpable as the States in their willingness to let inertia prevail."
The first Australian communication registered with the Human Rights Committee under the
Optional Protocol, Toonen v. Australia, (1992), Communication No. 488, which questions the
validity of a Tasmanian law criminalizing homosexuality, will require the Australian government to
confront squarely its international responsibility for breaches of human rights by the states and
territories.
141 "Human Rights Legislation in Canada" (Paper presented at the Toward the 21st Century:
Canadian/Australian Legal Perspectives Conference, 23-25 June 1991) [unpublished].
142 A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962) at 27.
143 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977) at 198-99.
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requires that a government treat its people with equal concern and
respect.144 Rights are "the majority's promise to the minorities that
their dignity and equality will be respected." They are the "one feature
that distinguishes law from ordered brutality." 145  Dworkin deems
human rights "trumps" in the political card game, which is otherwise run
according to a majoritarian notion of the collective good of the
community.1 46 It is the individual and non-majoritarian nature of
human rights protection that founds arguments for their special
entrenchment in a legal system. Thus Laurence Tribe observes that a
political majority will tend to operate with short-term goals and sacrifice
the concerns of minorities to them. Constitutional protection of
individual rights allows the limitation of future freedom of choice of the
majority "in order to reap the rewards of acting in ways that would elude
them under pressures of the moment. '147
However, the emphasis on the protection of individual autonomy
from government interference as the rationale for human rights law has
been strongly challenged. For example, radical criticism of the notion of
rights has been an important aspect of the attack on the liberal legal
order made by the Critical Legal Studies movement. It draws on the
Marxist tradition of criticism of rights for inspiration, but stops short of
identifying rights as a product of capitalism alone or accepting Marx's
prediction of the obsolescence of rights in a properly communal
society.148
The Critical attack on rights as the heartland of liberal legalism
has several aspects. There is the charge that the content of that category
of rights asserted to be universal and fundamental is in fact culturally
relative, and that modest developments in technology or gentle shifts in
public temperament could render particular freedoms redundant.1 49
Connected to this is the claim that statements of rights are
indeterminate and thus highly manipulable both in a technical and a
144 Ibid. at 179-80 and at 273-74.
145 Ibid. at 205.
146 Ibid. at xi.
14 7 L.H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (Mineola, N.Y: Foundation Press, 1978) at 10.
John Hart Ely, by contrast, attempts to avoid the anti-majoritarian character of human rights
entrenched in the United States Constitution by interpreting them as limited to the eradication of
obstacles to popular representation in the political process. See Democracy and Distrust
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980) at 75-77 and at 92-93.
148 S. Luke, "Can a Marxist Believe in Human Rights?" (1982) 1 Praxis Int'l 344.
149 M. Tushnet, "An Essay on Rights" (1984) 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1363 at 1364-71. See also M.
Tushnet, "Rights: An Essay in Informal Political Theory" (1989) 17 Politics & Soc'y 403.
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more basic sense. Recourse to the language of rights may give a
rhetorical flourish to an argument, but this provides only an ephemeral
polemic advantage and masks the fact that what is really needed is
political and social change.1s 0 To assert a legal right, some Critical
scholars argue, is to mischaracterize our social experience and to assume
the inevitability of social antagonism by affirming that social power rests
in the state and not in the people who compose it.151 The individualism
promoted by traditional understandings of rights limits their possibilities
by ignoring "the relational nature of social life."152 Talk of rights is said
to make contingent social structures seem permanent and to undermine
the possibility of their radical transformation; the only consistent
function of rights has been to protect the most privileged groups in
society.153
A parallel, but quite distinct, critique of rights has been made by
some feminist scholars. They have argued that a continuing focus on the
acquisition of rights may not be beneficial to women. According to
them, rights discourse overly simplifies complex power relations, and the
promise of rights may be thwarted by structural inequalities of power.15 4
The balancing of "competing" rights often reduces women's power155
and particular rights, such as the right to freedom of religion or the
protection of the family, can in fact justify the oppression of women.
15 6
A premise of both these critiques of rights is that rights discourse
is inherently political: the search for "neutral principles" as the basis of
a scheme of rights protection is quixotic. Legal phenomena cannot rest
150 Tushnet, "An Essay on Rights," ibid. at 1371-72.
151 P. Gabel & P. Harris, "Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and
the Practice of Law" (1982-3) 11 N.Y. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 369 at 375-76.
152 Tushnet, "An Essay in Informal Political Theory," supra note 149 at 410.
153 D. Kairys, "Freedom of Speech," in D. Kairys, ed., The Politics of Law (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1982) at 14041.
154 For example, E. Gross, "What is Feminist Theory?" in C. Pateman & E. Gross, eds.,
Feminist Challenges: Social and Political Theory (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1986) 190 at 192.
155 For example, C. Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (London: Routledge, 1989) at
145.
156 For example, H.B. Holmes, "A Feminist Analysis of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights," in C. Gould, ed., Beyond Dominationw New Perspectives on Women and Philosophy (Totowa,
NJ.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1983) at 250. Canadian feminists have made a distinctive contribution
to this critique in their analysis of judicial interpretation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. See, for example, E. Sheehy, "Feminist Argumentation before the Supreme Court of
Canada in R. v. Seaboyer, R. v. Gayme: The Sound of One Hand Clapping" (1991) 18 Melbourne
Univ. Law Rev. 450; and J. Fudge, "The Effect of Entrenchinj a Bill of Rights Upon Political
Discourse: Feminist Demands and Sexual Violence in Canada" (1989) 17 Int'l. J. Sociology L. 445.
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on an unquestionably "objective" basis for they are optional and deeply
controversial. The quest for objectivity, it has been said, rests on a fear
of the vulnerability of responses that come from deep within us.1 57 This
search distracts us from the responsibility of openly choosing the
political values to inform a constitutional text, and persuades us to
accept unchallenged the traditional distribution of political and
economic power.
The spasmodic debate over the last two decades over whether or
not a bill of rights should be introduced into Australian law has generally
not been influenced by the critical challenge to rights. Advocates and
critics in the debate share basically similar assumptions. "We have no
Bill of Rights and that means our work is strictly legal work," said Sir
Garfield Barwick, when he was Australian Chief Justice.158 The
identification of guarantees of rights as a political gesture is a consistent
theme with opponents of a bill of rights. For them, guarantees of rights
are futile because they are ultimately dependent on politics since
abstract rights lead to uncertain or political interpretations, and divert
the judiciary from their otherwise non-political tasks.15 9
Advocates of an Australian bill of rights employ the law-politics
distinction in a more subtle way than their opponents. By asserting the
fundamental nature of rights and the necessity of their guarantee in any
truly democratic order, the advocates imply that rights should be beyond
the vagaries of the political process: rights should be given legal, rather
than political, status.1 60 The advocates associate legality with calm and
rational decision, and politics with arbitrary action. Legality is linked
with the permanent and unchangeable, while the political is associated
with the contingent and changeable. While opponents of a bill of rights
warn of the danger of a politicized judiciary, advocates suggest that
judicial involvement in rights protection will depoliticize the issues.1 61
They argue that political protection alone subverts the very purpose of
15 7 L.H. Tribe, Constitutional Choices (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985) at
6.
1 5 8 G. Barwick, "Address to the National Press Club" (1976) 50 Austl. LJ. 433 at 434.
159 For example, H. Gibbs, "The Constitutional Protection of Human Rights" (1982) 9
Monash L Rev. 1 at 11-12.
160 For example, E. Thompson, "A Bit of Paper Called a Bill of Rights" in S. Encel, D. Home
& E. Thompson, eds., Change the Rules! Towards a Democratic Consliuttion (Ringwood, Vic.:
Penguin Books, 1977) 84 at 85.
161 For example, A. Mason, "A Bill of Rights for Australia?" (1989) 5 Austl. Bar Rev. 79 at
Reluctance About Rights
recognition of individual rights: guarding against the tyranny of the
majority and the preservation of diversity in societyj 62
Both sides in the Australian debate assume the separation of the
worlds of politics and law; advocates and opponents of a bill of rights
couch their arguments in legal terms and distinguish their adversaries'
case as "political." Thus, the dialogue takes place within the theoretical
context of legalism, assuming the existence of rules that distinguish
between "proper" and "improper" conduct, law and non-law, and that
every issue can be decisively resolved by finding and applying an
appropriate rule.163
How can the Australian debate about rights profit from the
Critical debate? The advice given by some critics of rights to those legal
systems that do not offer formal protection to human rights is to resist
their introduction. For example, Mark Tushnet claims that the Left in
Great Britain is "properly opposed to the adoption of a Bill of Rights; in
that culture a Bill of Rights would enhance the political power of the
privileged without bolstering the position of the Left."1 64 And Professor
Ison has described the Canadian Charter as "a calamity" and counselled
Australian lawyers to avoid the role of "sorcerer's apprentice" in
introducing bills of rights. 165 Canadian critics of the Charter have argued
against the entrenchment of rights because of the danger of what they
term the "legalization" or "judicialization" of politics, the "basic
democratic dilemma" that unelected judges will decide issues of
policy.16
6
Whereas without the Charter, the nature of rights can be, and is, largely worked out and
made concrete by legislation, with the Charter, a more or less substantial chunk of this job
is handed over to the courts. The task is taken from people who must be elected on the
basis of universal adult suffrage ... and handed over to a handful of lawyers appointed
once and for all. ... What is presented by the government as a strengthening of popular
power, turns out to be a restricting on the universal suffrage for which so many bloody
struggles were fought ..167
162 Ibid. at 88.
163 J. Shklar, Legalism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964) at 8.
1 6 4 Tushnet, "An Essay On Rights," supra note 149 at 1381.
165 T. Ison, "The Sovereignty of the Judiciary" (1985-6) 10 Adelaide L. Rev. 1 at 17 and at 31.
166 H. Glasbeek & M. Mandel, "The Legalization of Politics in Advanced Capitalism: The
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1984) 2 Socialist Studies/Etudes Socialistes 84 at 100.
See also A. Petter, "Legitimizing Sexual Equality: Three Early Charter Cases" (1989) 34 McGill
LJ. 358. For similar arguments in the British context, see K. Ewing, A Bill of Rights for Britain?
(London: Institute of Employment Rights, 1990).
167 Glasbeek & Mandel, ibid. 'at 100.
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In Australia, Peter Hanks has made similar warnings about the sporadic
enthusiasm for an entrenched bill of rights. 168
Is the legalization of politics a different danger from the
politicization of law, the fear of more conservative critics of
constitutionally entrenched rights? Both derive from a belief that the
province of the judiciary is qualitatively different from that of the
legislature. And yet the tolerance of any form of judicial review (for
example to protect the federal division of power) weakens the argument
against judicial interpretation of rights guarantees because all judicial
review is inherently political, depending on interpretative choice.169
Courts are a political forum. Moreover, concern about legalizing politics
as a result of introducing guarantees of rights tends to idealize
inaccurately the political realm as responsive to democratic pressures.
Our present "democratic" structures are controlled and manipulated by
various powerful interest groups and do not readily respond to the
concerns of individuals. Finally, even if parliamentary institutions could
more readily be identified with the authentic "popular will" of the
majority,170 it is unlikely that human rights would be given better
protection; the interests of individuals, outsiders, and minorities simply
do not enter the short term majoritarian calculus.
We should not abandon the potential of guarantees of rights
upon recognizing that they do not rest on a neutral "scientific" base and
are not panaceas for oppression. They indeed give new interpretative
power to an unelected judiciary and are capable of distortion in
preserving existing structures of domination. But, the assertion of rights
can have great symbolic force for oppressed groups within a society
offering a significant vocabulary to formulate political and social
grievances which is recognized by the powerful. Thus, Patricia Williams
1 6 8 P. Hanks, "Moving Towards the Legalisation of Politics" (1988) 6 Law in Context 80.
169 Ibid. at 91, Hanks distinguishes these forms of judicial review: "The fundamental
difference between the federal 'boundary-riding' role and the enforcement of fundamental rights
lies in the focus on legislative policies which the latter function involves. A Bill of Rights demands
judicial policy-making-an assessment of the wisdom of legislative choices, the striking of a balance
between competing values or interests, whether they be individual or collective interests." But the
distinction is difficult to maintain in practice as many "boundary-riding" decisions involve
fundamental questions of legislative policy. David Dyzenhaus points out that such distinctions
depend on a form of positivism: the legitimacy of judicial decisions depend on their reflection of
the decisions of the representatives of the majority, "The New Positivists" (1989) 39 U.T.L.J. 361 at
377.
170 Peter Hanks proposes that this might be done by, for example, ensuring the opportunity of
citizens to participate in the electoral process and the equality of voting rights. Hanks, supra note
168 at 95.
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has argued that for African-Americans talk of rights has been a constant
source of hope:
'[r]ights' feels so new in the mouths of most black people. It is still so deliciously
empowering to say. It is a sign for and a gift of selfhood that is very hard to contemplate
restructuring ... at this point in history. It is the magic wand of visibility and invisibility, of
inclusion and exclusion, of power and no power.71
And Martha Minow observes the problems in denying rights discourse to
traditionally dominated groups: "I worry about criticizing rights and
legal language just when they have become available to people who had
previously lacked access to them. I worry about those who have, telling
those who do not, 'you do not need it, you should not want it.' 172
Rights discourse also offers a focus for political consciousness
which can translate into action if legal remedies are inadequate.
173
David Dyzenhaus has pointed out that a legal system that contains
formal guarantees of rights provides a framework for rethinking political
questions: "[1]awyers can aim to raise consciousness and provoke
participation by focussing public attention on the ways in which society
fails to live up to its formally enacted promise."1 74 Moreover, the open-
textured language of rights can allow debate on legal and political
choices without assuming a settled social agenda. In this sense, the
language of rights can be interpreted as a communal rather than
individualistic discourse, "a brave and fragile assertion that the weak
have rights against the strong."175 It affirms "a community dedicated to
invigorating words with a power to restrain, so that even the powerless
can appeal to those words." 176
In a culture of legalism like Australia's, the discourse of rights
has a further dimension: it is an "abnormal" or revolutionary language
in the sense described by Richard Rorty: discourse that will "take us out
of our old selves by the power of strangeness, to aid us in becoming new
beings." The task of "abnormal" discourse is to stress the contingency of
all social institutions and to keep the conversation going rather than
171 "Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights" (1987) 22 Harv. C-
R C-LL. Rev. 401 at 431.
172 "Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover" (1987) 96 Yale L J. 1860 at 1910.
173 Dyzenhaus, supra note 169 at 374.
174 Ibid. at 378.
175 S. Sedley, "Freedom of Speech for Rupert Murdoch?" (19 December 1991) 13:24 London
Review of Books 3 at 5.
176 Minow, supra note 172 at 1881.
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ending it through the search for absolute foundations or answers 7 7 It
offers an alternative language to that of the mainstream culture and
challenges the mythology of the neutrality of the law, making clear the
political choices in any constitutional catalogue of rights. In this sense,
rights discourse can disturb and reshape existing patterns of Australian
legal thought.
Australians have much to learn from Canada's ten years
experience with its Charter of Rights and Freedoms. For example, the
importance of access to the legal process must be understood for rights
guarantees to have any impact on social injustice. Appreciation that
"private" abuses of power are as dangerous as "public" state abuses and
that rights should extend to protection by the state from corporate
invasions of individual rights is another lesson from Canada, as is the
restriction of corporate access to human rights.178 The need to draft
guarantees of rights so that they acknowledge disparities of power,
rather than assuming all people are equal in relation to all rights, must
also be recognized. 179 The challenge is then to invest a rights vocabulary
with meanings that challenge the current skewed distribution of
economic, social, and political power.180
IV. CONCLUSION
From the antipodes, the Canadian human rights structure seems
enviable: a constitutionally entrenched Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
broad federal and provincial human rights legislation, and impressive
participation in international human rights agreements. Although some
Canadian scholars may warn us of the disappointments, even deceptions,
of the Charter, Canada's system offers at least a much richer debate and
jurisprudence on human rights. In comparison, Australian discussion
about rights seems locked into a repetitive debate about the legitimacy
of judicial scrutiny of governmental action.
Moving beyond the assumptions of legalism and recognizing the
political nature of the judicial role allows the debate over the
177 R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1963) at 315-22, 357-65, and 377-89.
1 78 See Sedley, supra note 175; and Ison, supra note 165.
179 Canadian commentators have pointed out, for example, that the equality rights in the
Canadian Charter tend to be invoked by socially dominant groups or interests. See Greschner, supra
note 141; Sheehy, supra note 156; and Petter, supra note 166 at 360.
180 Minow, supra note 172 at 1910.
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introduction of a bill of rights to take new directions. It challenges both
the claim that democratic principles will be undermined by formal
guarantees of rights and the assertion that a bill of rights will radically
improve the position of individuals vis-a-vis government. The debate can
focus instead on whether rights can be absolute or whether they are
inevitably contingent; on the development of new forms of rights
guarantees; on whether and/or how the indeterminacy of formulations of
rights enables their manipulation. It can raise the question of whether
guarantees of rights distract attention from deep inequalities in society
and end up simply protecting the position of the privileged, or whether
rights talk has important symbolic significance for oppressed groups,
whatever its practical outcome.
The Australian reluctance about rights has produced a
precarious and lopsided structure for human rights protection. Aspects
of the 1991 National Report of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal
Deaths in Custody underline its inadequacy.181 The report found a
vastly disproportionate representation of Aborigines held in custody,
and criticized various practices of state police and prison officers.
Although the response of the states to interim reports of the Royal
Commission had been desultoy, the final report did not recommend
federal action to force the states to implement reforms. Paul Coe, Chair
of the National Aboriginal and Islander Legal Service, criticized this
federal deference:
By allowing the states to say whether they will or won't bring about changes and by
allowing the Commonwealth the option of backing off as to whether it will use its
constitutional powers to force the states to bring about changes, I think they have
reneged on their responsibility. ... [Wihen it comes to the use of their external affairs
powers and their race relations powers they lack the will to take on the states ...182
Are there signs of change in the design of Australian human
rights law on the threshold of the twenty-first century? The Australian
debate about rights has involved the polarization of the two major
political parties: a bill of rights has been part of the official platform of
181 Australia, Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, National Report,
(Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1991) (Commissioner: E. Johnston).
182 "Aboriginal Group Slams Death in Custody Report" The Age (11 May 1991). A recent
exception to this federal deference to state action is the Commonwealth government's decision to
use its power under the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984 to block the
construction of a dam by the Northern Territory government on Aboriginal sacred sites. See, "Win
for Aborigines as Dam is Ruled Out" The Age (18 May 1992) at 5. The federal government has
recently introduced legislation to create the office of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Commissioner within the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. See Human Rights
and Equal Opportunity Legislation AmendmentAct 1992.
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the Labor party since 1951 and most initiatives on rights have been taken
by Labor governments. 8 3 The Liberal-National Coalition, however, is
presently committed to the abolition of the Human Rights and Equal
Opportunity Commission. This divergence may be reducing slowly.
Certainly talk of rights has received the imprimatur of the Chief
Justice,18 4 although his interest in bills of rights seems to stem more
from concern that Australia was outside this "mainstream legal
development" than with dissatisfaction with the status quo.185
Conservative commentators have also recently begun to support
constitutional guarantees of rights.18 6 Australia's accession to the First
Optional Protocol to the Civil and Political Covenant, and its acceptance
of other international individual and state complaint mechanisms,187 will
allow a formal, international level of scrutiny of rights protection for the
first time.
But perhaps what is most crucial is for Australians to develop a
new, non-utilitarian notion of democracy, a sense that something is
wrong if minorities and disadvantaged groups within our society have
less possibility of having their human rights observed than socially
dominant groups. Our present complacency about the protection of
human rights in Australia is our greatest weakness.
183 The Commonwealth Minister for Justice has recently stated that the Labor government
has no present intention of introducing a bill of rights. 77teAge (25 May 1992) at 20.
184 In his address on being sworn in as Chief Justice in 1987, Sir Anthony Mason had argued
against judicially enforceable bills of rights. See "New Chief Justice Sees No Need for Bill of
Rights" WeekendAustralian (7-8 February 1987).
185 Mason, supra note 161 at 80.
186 For example, P.P. McGuiness, "Bill of Rights Robust System of Protection" Weekend
Australian (30-31 March 1991); and "Law Institute Calls for a Bill of Rights" The Age (9 October
1992) at 3.
1 8 7 See supra note 139.
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